




**Department of Energy**  
Washington, DC 20585

December 16, 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION**

FROM: John D. Evans   
Facility Representative Program Manager  
Office of the Departmental Representative to the  
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DR-1)

SUBJECT: Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report

Attached is the Facility Representative (FR) Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report covering the period from July to September 2004. Data for these indicators are gathered by Field elements quarterly per DOE-STD-1063-2000, *Facility Representatives*, and reported to Headquarters program offices for evaluation and feedback in order to improve the FR Program.

As of September 30, 2004, 89% of all FRs were fully qualified, the same as last quarter, and exceeding the DOE goal of 80%. Twenty of 28 reporting sites meet the goal for FR qualifications. Overall FR staffing is at 85% of the levels needed per the staffing analysis methodology in DOE-STD-1063-2000.

Eleven reporting sites currently meet all the DOE goals for the performance indicators (i.e., staffing 100%, qualification 80%, FR Time in Field 40%, FR Total Oversight Time 60%). These sites are: Brookhaven, Carlsbad, Fernald, Idaho (EM), Miamisburg, Pacific Northwest, Princeton, River Protection, Rocky Flats, West Valley and Y-12.

Current FR information and past quarterly performance indicator reports are accessible at the FR Web Site. Should you have any questions or comments on this report, please contact me at 202-586-3887.

Attachment

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report  
December 16, 2004

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**cc:**

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## ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SITES

### Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (3QCY2004)

<u>Field or Ops Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTE Level</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
Carlsbad	1	1	1	100	0	100	100	60	65
Idaho (EM)	8	9	9.5	105	0	100	100	41	78
Oak Ridge (EM)	20	14	14	70	0	93	93	42	61
OH/Fernald	5	5	5	100	0	100	100	47	80
OH/Miamisburg	3	3	3	100	0	100	100	41	62
OH/West Valley	2	2	2	100	0	100	100	61	80
Portsmouth/Paducah	4	4	4	100	0	50	50	34	61
Richland	19	17	17	89	1	100	100	45	71
River Protection	11	11	11	100	0	100	100	52	79
Rocky Flats	4	4	8	200	0	100	100	65	75
Savannah River	35	28	28	80	0	100	100	53	86
<b>EM Totals</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>102.5</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>&gt;80</b>	<b>&gt;40</b>	<b>&gt;60</b>

\* % Field Time is defined as the number of hours spent in the plant/field divided by the total available work hours in the quarter. The total available work hours is the actual number of hours a Facility Representative works in a calendar quarter, including overtime hours. It does not include leave time (sick, annual, or other) or holidays.

\*\* % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

### EM Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- At Carlsbad, an FR participated as a team member for the Type B Accident Investigation Board investigating on the August 25, 2004 head injury to a miner at WIPP.
- At Idaho (EM), three FRs provided extensive field oversight for the startup of the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP) facility. The AMWTP includes a highly complex Hazard Category 2 Nuclear Facility that will sort, resize, and repackage large quantities of stored transuranic wastes for shipment to WIPP.
- At Oak Ridge (EM), FRs working with the contracting officer's representative identified significant deficiencies in the Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC control of radiological materials. A letter was issued to BJC on August 31, 2004.
- At OH/Miamisburg, FRs provided oversight during shutdown of Tritium Emissions Reduction Facility and ensured provision for work planning and sequencing of clustered glove boxes/equipment removal to control the spread of contamination. Also, an FR observed a contractor using a torch without eye protection; discussed with contractor to prevent future occurrences.
- At OH/West Valley, FRs have been focused on providing oversight for the removal and size reduction efforts in support of the removal and size reduction efforts for the Vitrification Cell Dismantlement Project, waste packaging and shipping activities, and decontamination of the Head End Cells.
- At Richland, FRs participated on the DOE Readiness Assessment oversight team for receipt of K Basins North Loadout Pit sludge Large Diameter Containers at T-Plant. FRs also conducted oversight of preparations and movement of FFTF fuel and Shippingport reactor blanket fuel. Two FRs participated in a review of the FHI work control program. Concerns identified included: current revisions of the FHI work control procedures are lacking necessary detail to be used as an implementing procedure and application of lockout/tagout to fluid systems below 200°F and 500 psi are not being implemented consistently.
- At River Protection, an FR issued a Stop Work action as a result of a sub-contractor working inside a tank farms facility with inadequate hazard controls. Three individuals working at the location did not have the required personal protective equipment for the work, a job hazards analysis was not performed, and the operating contractor shift manager was unaware of the work activities being performed in the facility. As a result of the discovery, new requirements for sub-contractors working in tank farm facilities are being enforced, and contractor oversight has been increased.
- At Savannah River, FRs led and participated in a Readiness Assessment for the startup of neptunium processing at HB-Line. The FRs also performed oversight of the startup activities. Also, Waste Disposition FRs identified significant weaknesses in the contractor's program to implement TSR administrative controls for installing removable piping jumpers in the remote processing areas at DWPF.

## NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION SITES

### Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (3QCY2004)

<u>Site Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTE Level</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
Livermore	9	9	9	100	0	78	78	49	73
Los Alamos	16	16	15	94	0	93	43	49	75
Nevada	8	8	8	100	0	71	50	48	66
Pantex	10	8	7	70	0	86	86	41	64
Sandia	8	8	8	100	0	63	63	36	66
Savannah River	3	3	2	67	0	100	100	46	83
Y-12	9	9	9	100	0	100	89	48	77
<b>NNSA Totals</b>	63	61	58	92	0	84	66	46	71
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	-	-	-	100	-	-	>80	>40	>60

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\*\* % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

### NNSA Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- At Livermore, FRs worked closely with LLNL on reviews of Superblock Pu Facility and walked down the physical equipment with LLNL engineers and the DNFSB staff. The focus was on the ventilation systems, compressed air and fire protection systems with an emphasis on coming OA audits, improving system documentation and implementation of DSA TSRs. Substantial field work remains on this issue.
- At Los Alamos, several FRs were recently reassigned or received new duties, so the fully qualified number dropped last quarter. Also, an FR at TA-55 provided oversight of the mixed oxide (MOX) packaging, staging, loading, and shipment activities and readiness to start the operations involved in the MOX fuel. In addition, numerous FRs provided LASO oversight of the Management Self Assessments as part of the LANL resumption of work activities.
- At Nevada, the Waste Management FR identified weaknesses in the contractor's fugitive dust control program. The FR worked with the contractor to ensure corrective actions were taken which resulted in no fines from the State of Nevada. Also, FRs oversaw preparations for receipt of special nuclear material from LANL TA-18 to be stored at the Device Assembly Facility. There were no operational or safety issues identified during receipt operations.
- At Pantex, FRs performed various assessments including on Justifications for Continued Operations (JCO), surveillance activities on Technical Safety Requirement safety systems, and on the M&O contractor's Nuclear Safety Officer Program. Many issues were identified, including identification of the need for more formal implementation of JCO compensatory measures, failure to report safety system degradation in accordance with occurrence reporting requirements, and weaknesses with contractor understanding of authorization basis controls.
- At Sandia, an FR participated on the team assessing work control implementation in facilities maintenance, service contracts, and corporate construction. Also, an FR assisted in finalizing the TA-III Aerial Cable Facility re-start efforts.
- At Y-12, an FR drove several improvements in criticality safety at a facility. The FR facilitated several discussions with facility management and the criticality safety organization in order to ensure that in-use criticality safety documents and related interpretive documents were clear to the worker using them. An additional outfall of this effort was the commencement of a daily brief by a member of the criticality safety organization to the workers in order to ensure clarity of the requirements applicable to the day's work. Also, an FR provided the initial review and assistance in preparing a Safety Basis Authorization Document to allow continuation of a critical path operation leading to acceptance of special nuclear material from Aberdeen.
- At Savannah River, FRs finalized the Tritium Facility Representative Program Guide.

## OFFICE OF SCIENCE SITES

### Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (3QCY2004)

<u>Area/Site Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTE Level</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
Ames	1	1	1	100	0	100	100	20	80
Argonne-East	5	5	5	100	0	100	100	26	76
Brookhaven	6	6	6	100	1	100	100	42	91
Fermi	2	2	2	100	0	100	50	36	93
Oak Ridge (SC)	2	2	1	50	0	100	0	50	60
Pacific Northwest	2	2	2	100	0	100	100	42	71
Princeton	1	1	1	100	0	100	100	44	69
<b>SC Site Totals</b>	19	19	18	<b>95</b>	1	100	<b>89</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>81</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	-	-	-	<b>100</b>	-	-	<b>&gt;80</b>	<b>&gt;40</b>	<b>&gt;60</b>

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\*\* % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

### SC Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- At Brookhaven, while observing a BNL demolition job, one FR requested that the job be temporarily ceased based on discussions he was having with a worker at the job site. The worker and the FR had concerns about work planning and controls (dust suppression efforts, dust monitoring and sampling, hazard analyses, and hazard communication). BHSO and BNL met, resolved the concerns, and demolition work was commenced several days later. Also, an FR continues to participate on the BNL Hoisting and Rigging Working Group. The Group was started following a recurring occurrence in the hoisting and rigging area.
- At Fermi, FRs presence in the field increased due to the on-going, planned accelerator shutdown for routine maintenance and for installation of components in preparation for commissioning of the Neutrinos at the Main Injector (NuMI) and Electron Cooling Projects. Also, FR efforts have supported the technical review of the NuMI safety assessment document (SAD) as well as activities associated with the NuMI readiness review prior to commissioning.

## OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SITES

### Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (3QCY2004)

<u>Area/Ops Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTE Level</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
Argonne-West	3	3	3	100	0	100	100	29	64
Idaho (NE)	9	6	6	67	0	100	100	50	83
Oak Ridge (NE)	5	5	4	80	0	100	50	36	43
<b>NE Totals</b>	17	14	13	<b>76</b>	0	100	<b>85</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	-	-	-	<b>100</b>	-	-	<b>&gt;80</b>	<b>&gt;40</b>	<b>&gt;60</b>

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\*\* % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

### NE Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- At Argonne-West, future FR reports will be included in NE-ID information.
- At Idaho, because of a recent realignment of the Idaho Operations Office some facilities that were previously assigned to the NE-ID Environmental Management Organization have been reassigned to the NE-ID Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology Organization.
- Also at Idaho, a TRA FR noted excessive oil on the floor in the Advanced Test reactor (ATR) Diesel Generator Room. The oil, apparently a mixture of diesel fuel and diesel lubricating oil, covered many square feet of floor area between the two diesel generators and extended several feet to the wall of the diesel generator pit. The FR was concerned that the excessive oil could present a potential fuel source for a fire, and asked the Contractor Fire Protection Engineer to inspect the area with him. The Contractor Fire Protection Engineer concurred that the excessive oil presented an unnecessary fire-loading problem. Additionally, because the floor of the Diesel generator Room contained cracks oil was actively leaking through the floor into the ATR Switchgear Room. The Contractor responded quickly and appropriately when informed by the FR and the Contractor Fire Protection Engineer of the deficiency.